Gift giving is thought to be welfare decreasing. This claim rests on two key assumptions, namely, full information as to the whereabouts of all goods and the ability to reach the stores that contain desired goods costlessly. In this paper, we replace these two assumptions with the more realistic assumption of uncertainty about the location of goods. As a result, search costs ensue. In sharp contrast to existing economic models of gift giving, gifts in our model are given only when they enhance expected welfare, that is, the amount they save the receiver looking for the gift himself is higher than the expected price of unwanted gifts. The more difficult it is for the recipient to obtain the good he desires or the lower the price of this good, the more likely he is to receive it as a gift. Search costs affect not only the decision to give but also the choice of gift. We characterize the relationship between gift giving and the giver's information about the recipient's preferences as well as her information about the gifts available in the economy. We use our model to explain a number of stylized facts about gift giving in modern and primitive societies.
Introduction
For economists gift giving presents a puzzle: it persists in modern society despite the claim that in-kind gifts are necessarily inefficient and welfare reducing. This claim has spawned theoretical models attempting to account for it (see Camerer, 1988 , Carmichael and MacLeod, 1997 and Ruffle, 1999 as well as empirical tests of the magnitude of the welfare loss of gift giving (see Waldfogel, 1993 , Solnick and Hemenway, 1996 , List and Shogren, 1998 , and Ruffle and Tykocinski, 2000, along with a more detailed literature review in section 2).
Yet this claim rests on the assumptions that gift recipients possess full information as to the whereabouts of the goods they desire and that they are able to obtain such goods costlessly. In this paper, we relax these assumptions by adding uncertainty about the existence and location of goods. The addition of this uncertainty introduces search costs. Evidence of the importance of search cost savings in modern gift giving can be heard in common expressions of gratitude upon receipt of a gift: "where did you find it? I didn't know such an item existed," "I've looked all over for it, and couldn't find it," or, "I've wanted this for a long time, but never remember to buy it." In primitive societies, anthropological accounts point to the reduction of search costs as a motive for gift exchange and choice of exchange partners. In our model (described in section 3), the giver and the receiver visit different stores.
These stores sell only one kind of good, say good A or good B. Only the person visiting the store knows for sure the type of good sold by the store. The giver and the receiver each has a unit demand exclusively for good A or good B and zero utility for the other good. Each person knows his own preference and that the other person shares the same preference with probability µ. Each person simultaneously decides whether to purchase a unit of the good sold by his store. The giver also decides whether to purchase a unit of her store's good as a gift for the receiver.
1 The giver and the receiver then decide 1 To distinguish between the giver and the receiver, we adopt the convention that the giver is female, and the receiver is male.
independently whether to pay the search cost to visit the other's store.
Our stylized model captures several central features of real-world gift giving such as the unequal access to, or the non-uniform distribution of the location of, goods in an economy, gift givers' incomplete information about recipients' preferences as well as the search cost inherent in shopping. We characterize the relationship between each one of these features and gift giving. For instance, we show that gift giving increases as the search cost increases. Search costs affect not only the decision to give but also the choice of gift
given. In addition, the better informed the giver is about the receiver's preferences, the more likely she is to purchase an expensive gift and the less likely she is to buy a cheap one.
In either case, more information about the receiver's preferences increases the likelihood of giving a gift valued by the receiver and avoiding an unwanted gift, thereby increasing the expected welfare yield from gift giving. More generally, we show in section 4 that gifts in our model are welfare improving.
In modern gift giving, unwanted gifts may be returned for exchange, credit or a refund.
Section 5 extends our model to include the possibility that the gift recipient may return for a refund a gift item he already has or one that does not match his preferences. Adding refunds to our model increases the welfare yield from gifts still further.
In section 6 we discuss the empirical support for search cost related reasons for valuing gifts. We also discuss the ability of our model to account for other stylized facts about gift giving such as the giving of cash gifts to children and grandchildren, the custom of bringing gifts home from a trip abroad and the role of gender in gift giving. In addition to modern giving, we propose that the existence of search costs played a role in the adoption of gift giving as a means of exchange, the choice of trading partners, and the types of goods exchanged in the much studied gift-giving customs of hunter-gatherer societies.
Moreover, the demise of gift giving in these societies, we and others argue, came about, in part, due to contact with systems involving still lower search costs, namely markets.
Section 7 concludes with some final remarks.
Gift Giving in Economics
Once considered a subject studied primarily by sociologists and anthropologists, gift giving has more recently attracted the attention of economists. Economists have attributed a wide range of motives to gift giving. Waldfogel (1993) assumes that gift givers are altruistic (care about the utility of the receivers), while Tremblay and Tremblay (1997) posit paternalistic givers (care about what the receivers consume) to explain why in-kind gifts are usually preferred to cash gifts.
Most of the economics literature on gift giving, however, has been concerned with explaining why gifts are exchanged if they reduce welfare, and estimating the welfare yield of gifts. Camerer (1988) develops a model in which gifts are given in the first stage of a two-stage investment game. The more inefficient the gift, the more credibly it signals the giver's willingness to invest in the relationship in the second stage. Carmichael
and MacLeod (1997) use an evolutionary framework to show how the exchange of inefficient gifts at the beginning of a relationship discourage parasites thereby promoting trust necessary for long-term cooperation.
Ruffle (1999) does not assume that gifts are welfare reducing as his starting point. In his model, the utility from gifts consists of not only the monetary cost and monetary value of the gift but also the emotions associated with the gift as measured by the difference between the gift expected and the gift given. He derives the condition that gift giving improves welfare if the giver's pride and the receiver's surprise from the gift plus the receiver's monetary valuation of the gift exceed the giver's monetary cost.
Apart from emotional and other psychological factors, there appear to be two economic sources of welfare-improving gifts. First, gifts may procure a source of insurance for the giver. Parents may give gifts to their children in the hope that the children will care for them in their old age. Posner (1980) discusses the role of gift giving in primitive societies as insurance against hunger. Given the high variance in returns from production and the paucity of alternatives on which to spend excess output, surplus was given to another group with the implied obligation of repayment at some future date. Such insurance-motivated gifts may indeed be welfare improving.
While our model is consistent with the insurance motive for gifts under certain conditions -in fact, we apply our model to gift giving and food-sharing rules in hunter-gatherer societies -we focus on a second source of welfare-improving gifts, namely, the giver's ability to find a suitable match between gift good and recipient. For this to occur, the giver must know something about the receiver's preferences and, equally importantly, she must know more about some aspect of the gift good than the receiver. A receiver cannot always easily or cheaply obtain the good he desires, or may not even know it exists. (Our title captures these two possibilities.) The giver who possesses superior information about such a good, i.e. lower search costs, gives it as a gift. The good's features, availability, location and price are all potential sources of the giver's superior knowledge of the gift good. The giver may, when traveling abroad, for instance, come across a good not easily found or at a lower price than available to the recipient. The giver may also possess superior information about the gift good due to her own experience with or own consumption of the good. Indeed, the following excerpt offers a colorful example.
"History records that during the reign of Queen Elizabeth the custom of presenting New Year's gifts was carried to great extremes. Gifts of extravagant value were presented to the Queen, and the people made many gifts among themselves . . . the least valuable of the gifts which the Queen received was a pair of black silk knit stockings. Such stockings were rare, indeed. Until that time the Queen had worn cloth hose. But the gift so delighted her that she vowed never to wear cloth hose again. Nor did she!" (Eichler, 1924, p. 281) In a similar vein, there are goods for which the recipient needs to make some investment before he begins to enjoy their consumption, that is, the recipient must learn to consume them. For instance, you may know that your parents could make good use of a computer, a palm pilot or a video camera, if only they knew how to operate such hi-tech items.
Likewise, the recipient may learn his preferences only by consuming the good. Goods like classical music or fine wines are an acquired taste or, in the words of Stigler and to appreciate them. The giver may recognize the recipient has the potential to enjoy such goods if only he was exposed more regularly to them. We elaborate on additional examples throughout the paper and especially in section 6 on stylized facts.
Model

Setup
Suppose there are two stores and two types of goods, A and B, with each store selling only one of the two goods at price p. Each store has equal probability of selling either good and together the stores have a known probability α ∈ [0, 1] of selling the same good.
There are two people whom we shall refer to as G and R. The giver, G, decides whether to purchase a gift for the receiver, R. Each person is risk neutral and has utility v for the consumption of one unit of his preferred good (exclusively either good A or good B), and zero utility for the other good; the purchase of a unit of either good entails disutility equal to the good's price p. Each person knows his own preference and knows that the other has the same preference as his own with probability µ ∈ [0, 1]. Communication of one's preferences is not permitted, as indicated by the first phrase of our title, "something you never asked for."
Each person simultaneously visits a different store from the other person (Table 1 displays the joint probabilities that G and R will visit a particular pair of stores). While at the store, each person decides independently whether to purchase for himself a unit of the good that his store sells. In addition, G decides whether to purchase a unit of her store's good as a gift for R. Next, not observing the other's purchase decision, each person decides whether to visit the other store at a cost of c. At the second store, both people again face the same decision, whether to buy the store's good for themselves; G also decides whether to buy a unit of the good as a gift for R. 
Equilibrium Analysis
Consider the two strategies that R has available to satisfy his unit demand for his desired good. First, he buys the good if the first store he visits sells his desired good; if not, he does not continue to search and thus does not visit the second store. Alternatively, he also buys the good if the first store he visits carries his desired good, but if not, he continues to the second store. If R follows the first strategy, then G has four possible pure strategies: she may never buy a gift (never1); she may always buy a gift independent of the store she visits (Always); she may buy a gift if and only if she visits a store that sells her own desired good (if own); or she may buy a gift if and only if she visits a store that sells the other good, the one for which she has zero utility, in the hope that it is valued by R (if other).
Taking each of these strategies in turn, consider the sum of G and R's expected utility, that is, R's expected utility from the consumption of his preferred good minus the expected cost incurred by G and R from the purchase of goods A and B. We call this the pair's net expected utility. 2 Without loss of generality, we assume R's desired good to be good A throughout the analysis. With probability 1/2, the store that R visits sells good A and he purchases a unit for himself in which case his expected utility is
is never to buy R a gift (never1), then this is also the pair's net expected utility, that is,
If G follows the strategy always buys R a gift (Always), then G and R's total expected cost from purchases equals 3 2 p, since G always buys R a gift and R buys the good for himself half of the time (whenever he visits an A store first). Only when both G and R's stores sell good B does R not receive his desired good. This occurs with probability α/2 implying that R's expected utility from the consumption of his desired good is v(1 − α/2).
Summing these two expressions yields,
If G buys R a gift only when she visits a store that sells her own desired good (if own), then p is the expected cost in attempting to satisfy R's unit demand: half of the time G's store sells her own desired good ( 1 2 p) and half of the time R's store sells good A (
The recipient values G's gift if and only if G and R have the same preferences (µ) and G visits an A store while R visits a B store (
1−α 2
). With probability 1/2, R purchases his desired good for himself (
v). Taking these expressions together, we obtain the pair's net expected utility from this strategy:
An analogous logic leads us to the expected utility from the strategy if other in which G buys R a gift if and only if she visits a store that doesn't sell her preferred good.
Note that the three strategies that involve the purchase of a gift (Always, if own, if other) imply that the gift is bought in the first store that G visits. Given that there are only two stores, G will never purchase a gift from the second store since she knows that R has already been there and would have purchased from that store if it sells R's desired good.
Let us now consider R's second available strategy, that is, to continue to the second store if the first store he visits does not sell his desired good. If this is R's strategy, G would never buy a gift good for R because she knows that R will come to her store (never2). 3 The expected utility of R from this strategy (which equals the pair's net expected utility since G buys no gift) equals 1/2(v − p) in the case that R's first store sells good A, and 1/2(1 − α)(v − p) − c/2 if it does not. Simplifying, we obtain:
By comparing the expected utilities of each of the strategies, we can solve for the conditions under which each one is the equilibrium strategy.
Always is the equilibrium strategy if and only if
The last condition reveals that Always can never be an equilibrium strategy if p > c.
This is so because either G will allow R to buy the good for himself (never2) when µ is close to one half, or she will restrict herself to buying a gift when she believes it to be suitable for R, that is, when µ is close to 1 (if own) or close to 0 (if other).
The intuition underlying the Always equilibrium can be most easily seen for the case of perfectly negatively correlated stores (α = 0). In this case, if the price of buying a gift is less than R's search cost, c, then G will always buy R a gift unless he is almost certain of R's type in which case she restricts herself to buying a gift only when she is at the store that sells R's preferred good. Put differently, as the price of buying a gift decreases, 3 In a modified setup not considered herein there may exist a third possible strategy for R which we may think of as never0. The recipient may choose never to buy the good even if his store sells the good he desires. Instead of assuming that the two stores sell the same good with probability α, suppose that there is a high probability, say 0.95, that G's store sells good A and a low probability, say 0.01, that R's store sells good A. For the appropriate parameters, even if R's store sells good A, he will not buy the good for himself since he expects to receive it from G.
G is more likely always to buy R a gift since it is cheap to do so compared to R's cost of buying the good himself.
When visiting a foreign country and custom dictates an exchange of gifts between host and guest who may not know each other's preferences well, an inexpensive gift from one's home country that is not readily available in the foreign country is typical. On the other hand, if G has better information about R's preferences, then she may restrict her purchase of a gift to a store that contains the good she believes R prefers.
Namely,
if own is the equilibrium strategy if and only if
p > v(1 − α)(1 − µ), µv(1 − α) > p, µ > 1/2 and c > v(1 − α)(1 − µ) + αp.
if other is the equilibrium strategy if and only if
It is common to bring home gifts from a trip abroad. One explanation for this custom is the high search costs if the recipients were to attempt to procure such gifts themselves.
The office secretary or colleague at work whose preferences the giver does not know well may receive a souvenir keychain, perfume, or exotic chocolates (Always), whereas closer 4 The following scenario illustrates another appropriate use of the Always strategy. It is July and fresh corn on the cob has just come in season. You are on your way to visit a friend when you pass a roadside stand with fresh cobs on sale, 12 for $2. You don't remember if your friend likes corn on the cob, but since you are right there and it's only $2, you pick up a dozen corn for your friend.
friends or family whose preferences are known by the giver receive gifts more tailored to their tastes. For instance, while visiting India you may bring back a doll for a friend whom you know collects dolls because you know that her cost of locating such a doll is prohibitive (if own or if other depending on your own preferences).
never1 is the equilibrium if and only if
If the giver is uncertain whether the recipient really likes dolls, and the particular handmade doll from India is expensive, then the giver does not buy it (never1). If one does not have to travel to India to find such a doll, but can readily find it at certain local gift shops (low c and α close to 1), then, uncertain about the receiver's preferences, the giver concludes that if the recipient wants the doll, he can easily buy it for himself (never2).
never2 is the equilibrium strategy if and only if
To illustrate these different equilibria, we may fix v = 100 and c = v/4 = 25, choose a particular value of α, and graph the equilibrium regions as a function of p and µ. (the goods sold by the stores are uncorrelated) and α = 2/3 (positive correlation between the goods sold in the two stores), respectively. We chose c sufficiently small so that all five strategies exist in equilibrium. For c sufficiently large, never2 cannot be an equilibrium strategy; that is, high search costs discourage R from continuing to the second store. To solve for the appropriate c we need to solve simultaneously the conditions under which
Always and never1 are preferred to never2. The solution yields c =
. Notice that as α increases, the critical value for c decreases since there is an increasing chance that the good sold in the second store is the same one he passed up in the first store.
More generally, for any value of α, the entire (p, µ) parameter space can be characterized by the following six linear inequalities. .25
.75
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These equations will be useful in deriving propositions concerning gift giving. Let us define gift giving as expected number of gifts given from G to R.
Proposition 1 As the receiver's cost of search, c, increases, gift giving increases.
Proof:
From equations (1)- (5), we observe that c affects the expected utility of the never2 strategy only. Thus, all other equilibrium regions are affected by a change in c only to the extent that they border on never2. As c decreases, R increasingly prefers to continue to search rather than stop after not finding his preferred good in the first store he visits. Put differently, the never2 region shrinks as c increases. This means that the three gift-giving equilibrium regions all expand as c increases. Gift giving increases. 2
Loosely speaking, lower search costs mean that G need not take a chance on buying a gift for R that he may not like. By continuing to search at little additional cost, R can buy the good for himself.
If a gift-giving occasion or the nature of a relationship dictates that a gift must nonetheless be given, Proposition 1 suggests that the type of gifts changes as a function of c. 
From equation (8) we see that never1 shrinks with respect to never2 as v increases. While this involves no change in gift giving, all remaining shifts in equilibrium strategy result in increased gift giving. For instance, Equations (6) and (7) reveal that:
i) never1 decreases with respect to the two gift-giving strategies with which it borders, namely, if own and if other; ii) Always increases with respect to if own and if other.
Gift-giving strategies if own and if other increase at the expense of never2, as seen by (10) and (11), respectively. Because the gift good is worth more to the receiver, it is more important that he indeed consumes it. Thus, he is more likely to receive it as a gift (Proposition 2) or search for the good himself (and hence never2 increases relative to never1).
Proposition 3
As the price of the gift, p, decreases, gift giving increases. In fact, for small enough p, to always give a gift becomes the equilibrium.
Proof: As Figures 1-3 
2
This is simply the law of demand for gift giving. As the price of a gift decreases (relative to its potential utility), the giver is more likely to buy it, paying less attention to whether the gift may actually suit the recipient preferences. The suggestion above to
give to Chinese hosts and business associates T-shirts with English words on them, the content of which "hardly matters" (since v is so high) aptly illustrates this point.
Perhaps the best example of Always as the equilibrium strategy for sufficiently small p are the egalitarian food-sharing rules characteristic of hunter-gatherer societies. A hunter who kills a large animal, such as a giraffe, a bear or an antelope, gives away much of the kill to tribe members outside his immediate family. For inadequate storage technologies guarantee the meat's spoilage before he and his family can consume all of it. The excess meat thus costs him next to nothing, while the implied obligation of reciprocity ensures that his gift will be returned at some future date. . By (8) and (9) . Given µ > 1/2, as µ increases it crosses the boundary with, and enters, the if own equilibrium region, thereby increasing gift giving. Alternatively, given µ < 1/2, as µ decreases it crosses the boundary with, and enters, the if other equilibrium region, thereby increasing gift giving. To complete the proof of i), choosep = v − c 1−α so that never1 is the equilibrium strategy. If µ > 1/2, then increasing µ will eventually lead to the if own equilibrium; while if µ < 1/2, then decreasing µ will eventually lead to the if other equilibrium. In both of these cases, gift giving increases. . For p <p and the appropriate initial beliefs given by (6) and (7), Always is the equilibrium strategy, as seen by (9) . If µ > 1/2, then increasing µ eventually shifts the equilibrium strategy to if own. Similarly, if µ < 1/2, then decreasing µ eventually shifts the equilibrium strategy to if other Both of these shifts away from Always decrease gift giving.
Proposition 4 There exists a price threshold,p, such that, i) above this threshold more information about the recipient's preferences increases gift giving
2
Proposition 4 illustrates the importance of beliefs about the recipient's preferences in the decision to give and the choice of gift. Below a certain price,p, more information about R's preferences decreases gift giving: the giver may not always buy the (cheap) gift if she knows that it is not appropriate. While a bottle of perfume or liquor, or a box of chocolates may be an appropriate gift for the office secretary or a colleague at work, you may well know that a best friend would not particularly appreciate such a gift, and therefore not buy it. On the other hand, above this threshold price, gift giving increases with more information about R's preferences. You are not likely to take a chance with a relatively expensive gift unless you know the recipient will like it.
Proposition 5 For sufficiently high search cost c, as α increases, gift giving decreases.
Proof:
If c is sufficiently large such that never2 cannot be an equilibrium strategy, Intuitively, the likelihood that R already has the gift good increases with α; therefore G is less likely to buy this good for him as a gift.
Proposition 6 For sufficiently low search cost c, as α increases, gift giving necessarily increases for a certain set of parameters.
Proof:
For this proposition to hold, we require that never2 exists as an equilibrium strategy; in other words, c ≤ 
2
In words, as α increases, the boundary between never2 and if own swivels in a counterclockwise direction. For points on this line close enough to the Always region, µ is falling as α increases. Thus, points that were previously located on the boundary of never2-if own or strictly within never2 for a particular α fall within if own as α increases.
A similar logic applies to points located within never2 near the Always and if other boundaries. As α increases, these points fall within the if other region.
At first glance, that gift giving can actually increase as the probability that the two stores sell the same goods increases seems counterintuitive. However, when the cost of search and the gift's price are non-trivial and G is neither completely uninformed nor completely certain of R's preferences, then in the case of perfect negatively correlated stores, if R does not find his preferred good at the first store, he knows that he can obtain it with certainty at the second store. Since v − p > c, he will proceed to purchase the good at the second store. G gives no gift (never2). As the correlation between the stores increases, R becomes less and less certain that the second store contains his desired good.
Given the non-trivial search cost and G's partial knowledge about R's preference, G will save R the search cost by buying him the good as a gift.
The following scenarios capture roughly the intuition behind this proposition. The recipient may have looked around for something similar, didn't find it, and therefore is surprised to receive the item as a gift. Alternatively, the receiver may have not known a particular good existed. Both of these sources of utility and motives for gift giving are heightened, the higher the α.
Welfare Implications
Standard economics claims that unless a gift that costs the giver p dollars exactly matches the way in which the recipient would have spent the p dollars, the gift is suboptimal: the cost to the giver exceeds the gift's value to the recipient; gifts are therefore welfare decreasing and a source of inefficiency.
6 Thus, cash is the optimal gift because it allows the recipient to allocate optimally the money, according to his preferences. In fact, Waldfogel (1993) conducts a survey of Christmas gifts received to test this claim. He finds that, on average, recipients value the gifts they receive at 13% less than their estimates costs. conduct a random n-th price auction in which subjects indicate the prices at which they are willing to sell individual gifts received for Christmas. They find that on average subjects value their gifts at 121%
The tack taken by economists has been to show that gifts serve some (economic) function that compensates for the welfare loss associated with gifts. Camerer (1988) develops a signaling model in which gifts, particularly inefficient ones, serve as costly signals of the giver's intent to invest in a future relationship. Inefficient gifts in Carmichael and MacLeod's (1997) evolutionary framework also aid in relationship building where gifts exchanged break down mistrust and permit cooperation.
These models beg the question: why continue to give gifts in well-established relationships in which signaling plays no role and issues of mistrust are not relevant? The answer may lie in the fact that gifts may not be as inefficient as economists typically assume.
The economic model of gift giving assumes that individuals, receivers in particular, possess full information (as to the whereabouts of all desired goods) and that they are able to obtain these goods costlessly, i.e. a frictionless economy. However, this same model denies the giver full information regarding the receiver's preferences. The conclusion that gifts are welfare reducing thus rests on the selective application of the full information assumption. More realistically, informational asymmetries and frictions such as transaction costs and search costs exist and differentiate individuals. Our model relaxes the assumption that receivers possess full information thereby introducing frictions.
By construction, the giver in our model buys a gift if and only if it has positive expected utility for the pair. She chooses the gift-giving strategy that maximizes the pair's net expected utility. Thus, gift giving is welfare improving in our model.
The expected cost of a gift received is simply p. The expected value of a gift depends on the gift-giving strategy employed. Always yields
The expected value of a gift received when if own is the giver's strategy equals
Notice that the partial derivative of all three of these expressions with respect to α is negative. Namely, the expected welfare gain of gifts is a decreasing function of α. As the correlation between the goods sold by two stores increases, the likelihood that the receiver already owns the gift (and therefore to 135% of the estimated costs.
derives zero utility from it) increases. In addition, as can be seen from the expected values of gifts received from the if own and if other strategies, the more informed is the giver about the recipient's preferences, the greater the welfare yield:
> 0.
Refunds
In modern societies, unwanted gifts may often be returned for exchange, credit or a refund.
In this section, we extend our model to permit returns. If the gift is a good that R already has or does not want, then he may return it. Because we assume that stores sell only one type of good, we exclude the possibility of exchange or credit and focus our attention on refunds. Assume that R pays c to return the good. 8 When returned, R receives a refund in the amount paid for the good, p. We examine how the possibility of refunds affects G's optimal gift-giving behavior.
First of all, notice that for p < c, the recipient will not bother to return the gift. Put differently, for p < c the equilibrium regions remain unaffected for all α since there are no returns. This implies that the Always equilibrium region remains unchanged since p < c is a necessary condition for the existence of the Always equilibrium. The addition of returns therefore affects the utility of the gift-giving strategies if own and if other only. The pair's net expected utility from each of these strategies in light of returns is given below:
there are some notable exceptions. For example, as children grow up, parents tend to substitute money for in-kind gifts (see Camerer, 1988 , p. S198 and Caplow, 1982, p. 386).
Our model offers two explanations for this stylized fact. First, as children spend less time with their parents and begin to develop their own identities, parents know less well their children's preferences, and therefore tend to give a gift certain to be of use to their children, namely, money. Second, as children become more independent their search costs shrink and along with this so do the parents' previously held informational advantages (the location of a desired good, or its range of available prices). While parents may know what sort of toy would make a suitable gift for their eight-year-old child, and where to find it, they may be at loss when it comes to the music or fashion preferred by their fifteen-year-old child.
The disappearance of the parents' search cost advantage over their child culminates with the child's wedding: the child now has a spouse to share in the division of labor, including the search for goods. Cash gifts as a wedding present from parents are thus ubiquitous.
Children receive cash gifts from their grandparents even more frequently and from an earlier age. Both Caplow (1982) and Waldfogel (1993) report that grandparents were the most frequent givers of money; nearly half of the gifts received from grandparents in their studies were money. The grandparents choice may be motivated by insufficient information about their grandchild's preferences. Our model is not only consistent with this explanation (µ close to 1/2 implies never1 or never2 for p sufficiently high), but also offers an additional one: grandparents may have higher search costs than other family members either because they have more difficulty locating a gift their grandchild will appreciate, or because poor health or limited mobility reduces their ability to search.
Bringing Gifts Home from a Trip Abroad:
As noted in the discussion of the if own and if other equilibria on pages 9 and 10, it is customary to bring home gifts for loved ones when returning from a trip abroad. If gift giving is welfare reducing, how did this custom evolve? The answer is that specialty items purchased abroad may be welfare improving. Either because such items are not available at home (α = 0 and high c) or they are considerably more expensive at home, givers take advantage of their trip abroad to purchase good-value gifts they know receivers will appreciate, welfare-improving gifts. Persian carpets from Turkey, truffles from Belgium, wooden cuckoo clocks from Switzerland, fabrics and clothing from India and rum from Jamaica are examples of such commonly purchased gift items. Finally, 6% of the receivers revealed that they "didn't know this item was available" (α close to 0, and therefore high c). It is worth adding that these reasons and the associated percentages concern Christmas gifts.
Reasons for Valuing Gifts
As the previous stylized fact points out, search costs and the unavailability of the gift item are even more important factors for non-gift-giving occasions, such as trips abroad. To illustrate the role of search costs in gift exchange in hunter-gatherer societies, we focus on the !Kung tribe of the Kalahari desert in southern Africa. The !Kung are among the most thoroughly studied and best documented of all hunterer-gatherer societies and their relationship to gift giving is typical of hunter-gatherer societies.
The Role of Gender in Gift Giving
Anthropologists have attributed several motives to gift exchange among the !Kung or hxaro as it is known in their native language (see Lee, 1979, and Wiessner, 1982 , for detailed accounts of hxaro). For example, gift exchange maintains and expands one's set of social ties. Second, the ability to request a particular gift from someone and the obligation to comply serves to level wealth differences. As concerns the giving of meat, perhaps the most significant reason is the reduction in the variance of consumption (see Wiessner, 1982) . In addition to these motives, anthropologists regularly cite, either explicitly or implicitly, the reduction of search costs. Yellen (1990) writes that "individuals purposely selected gift-giving partners from distant territories. Presumably it was hoped that a partner would have something to offer when goods were difficult to obtain locally" Thus, through repeated transactions, the implied obligation to reciprocate, the use of personal connections and the reputation for reliability, gift exchange can function well, reducing search costs and providing greater (diversity in) consumption than autarky.
Nonetheless this system of gift exchange is stable as long as an institution promising still lower search costs and greater variety of goods, such as a marketplace, doesn't come into contact with it. This hints at the fate of gift exchange among the !Kung.
By all accounts, the !Kung were traditionally a successful tribe hunting more than 60 animal species and foraging over 100 edible plant species. However, contact with the Bantu tribe and the market economy of Botswana in the 1970s led to dramatic changes in the !Kung way of life. Most significantly for our purposes, in place of hunting and gathering, the !Kung began planting fields and herding goats and cows. As successful hunters and gatherers, the !Kung, argues Yellen, abandoned hunting and its inherent gift exchange due to "factors other than a failure of the food-securing system" (p. 77). In fact, Yellen's data shows that the already varied diet of the !Kung in terms of number of species consumed did not become more varied after adopting herding and farming.
What their adoption of farming and herding and their contact with the market economy of Botswana did permit was the accumulation of goods previously unavailable to them, such as iron pots, plows and extra blankets. In fact, Yellen concludes that "[o]ne major catalyst of change appears to have been a sudden easy access to goods. Perhaps a similar phenomenon contributed to the demise of past foraging societies" (p. 72).
11
Final Remarks
The conventional economic wisdom that gift giving is welfare reducing rests on two notterribly-realistic assumptions, the gift recipient's full information as to the existence and whereabouts of all desired goods and his ability to obtain these goods costlessly. In this paper, we develop a model in which the recipient is uncertain about the goods available in the economy. Resolving this uncertainty entails incurring search costs.
Gift giving in our model follows from an attempt to save the receiver the uncertainty and the cost of searching for the good himself. The higher the search costs, the more gift giving we find. In equilibrium, gifts in our model are welfare improving. Our intent is not to state that all gifts are necessarily welfare improving, but that certain gifts, motivated by reducing search costs, may be.
11 Kranton (1996) models the interaction between a gift exchange economy and a market exchange economy. In her model, gift exchange can function well when the market is thin and it is therefore difficult to buy and sell goods on the market. On the other hand, a thick market furnishes a wider range of commodities at lower search costs than the gift-exchange economy. This encourages shirking on reciprocal-exchange agreements and a shift to the market outcome.
The search-cost motive for gift giving need not be inconsistent with other motives such as signaling, building trust or the desire to arouse positive emotions or to avoid negative ones. For instance, a gift the recipient didn't know existed (α close to zero), or a gift purchased while abroad or, more generally, a gift appreciated by the receiver all signal thoughtfulness, a familiarity with his preferences, and therefore a desire to invest in a continued relationship with him. Moreover, these same circumstances may evoke positive emotions such as surprise and pride, just as the failure to recognize and avoid the gift of a good with low search costs, or the gift of a good the receiver already has is likely to evoke disappointment and embarrassment.
In our modern world of technology, innovation and the information age, the question Furthermore, the fast pace of modern society with its ever expanding range of leisure pursuits places a premium on our time. In other words, search costs are high. In some instances, time-intensive activities have been replaced by activities that provide more "bang for the buck", for instance, telephone calls and e-mail correspondence substitute for personal visits, movies replace reading, and fitness classes are in lieu of long walks. As this trend continues, we can expect gift giving motivated by saving both the giver and the receiver search costs to take on an even more central place in our personal relationships.
The sociologist Michael Schudson expresses similar sentiments.
Just as every bought object is a convenience good, compared to something homemade, so every giving of things rather than sharing of time is a convenience. The commercialization of Christmas is a sign that people are choosing to express their social natures and their generous natures through material goods, which are both convenient to buy and often relatively permanent as a social bond.
In a society in which, increasingly, both parents work outside the home, this type of materialism is likely to increase as people choose to save time rather than money. (Schudson, 1986, p.29) 
